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＊ 2016 年 8 月 22 日 原稿受理 the vehicle which is responsible for the in-vehicle key management. Each ECU in the vehicle can then load new keys that are either generated and distributed by the Key Master or derived on each ECU based on a trigger from the Key Master. These approaches have the following advantages:
• Improve security strength, by separating the necessary key management to be handled on an OEM backend and on the in-vehicle network, and making it easy to have different, short-lived session keys within each vehicle
• Enable faster assembly as it is not necessary to generate and load all keys onto the ECUs during production and thus reducing the time needed to be connected to the OEM backend
• Enable replacement of ECUs at dealer locations without the need to be connected to the OEM backend to download keys
• Reduce cost and complexity as it is not necessary to manage all keys in one central location on an OEM backend.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• We propose approaches for secure and efficient in-vehicle key management, which handle key management of ECUs in each vehicle itself rather than on an OEM backend.
• We have designed simple protocols based on key distribution and key derivation approaches, respectively, where a Key Master in a vehicle generates and distributes new keys to ECUs or triggers each ECU to derive new keys.
• We have implemented the protocols on a test bench and performed an evaluation of the results in terms of performance and security.
HIS, a car consortium consisting of several major 1) , and to prevent replay attacks, the same pair of freshness value and key can never be used twice. To ensure that they are never used twice, there are two possibilities:
• Storing the current freshness value in non-volatile memory (NVM) when turning the ignition off so that it is possible to increment and continue using the freshness value with the same key.
• Distributing new session keys when turning the ignition on, in which case the freshness value can be reset. Threats to the in-vehicle key management approaches we consider in this paper are as follows:
• Attacker distributes own keys to ECUs In this section, we propose two key establishment approaches: 1) key distribution based on SHE 2) , and 2) key establishment based on key derivation. For properly, the same method as in Approach 1 could be used.
Key management proposal
Requirements for the key management approaches are shown in Table 2 and Table 3 .
In our prototyping, we tried to use AUTOSAR CSM;
however, the APIs relevant to key management are not defined in detail. Therefore, in Table 4 , we propose some details for APIs that are suitable for our suggested approaches.
We have implemented the two approaches presented in previous section and performed an evaluation of performance and analysis of the implementation. The setup is described as follows: Table 2 Requirements for key management approach 1 Table 3 Requirements for key management approach 2 Fig. 3 Key establishment based on key derivation Table 4 APIs proposal Table 5 implementation environmentl
Evaluation and analysis
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We used two microcontrollers for MCU A and B.
Each microcontroller is compliant with SHE, and these are designed by different semiconductor vendors.
The task period and CAN transmitting period are based on realistic performance. The software sizes required to run the in-vehicle key management are shown in Table 6 .
*RAM size depends on message buffer size.
Approach 1
The results for Approach 1 are first discussed. The • Loading one key takes: 27 ms + (5 ms * <number of ECUs>).
• Total time: <number of keys> * (27 ms + (5 ms * <number of ECUs>))
It would be possible to perform some steps in parallel.
For example, while Key Master is sending M1-M3 to the first ECU, the Key Master can generate keys and M1-M3 for the following ECUs.
Analysis about the threats that we defined
To protect M2 and M3, a pre-shared MASTER_ ECU_KEY needs to be stored on the Key Master and the ECUs. This initial key needs to be loaded during, e.g., production. For an attacker to be able to load own keys, the attacker needs to know the MASTER_ ECU_KEY to be able to create legitimate M2 and for the corresponding key will be incorrect and the command to load the key will fail, thus preventing replay attacks.
Approach 2
The results for Approach 2 are described below. The Key Master initiates the key update by incrementing the counter and calculating a MAC and sending the counter and MAC to the ECUs. The same steps can be performed in parallel on all ECUs to derive the keys.
The flow and time measurements are shown in Fig. 7 .
First, the transmission of the 8-byte counter and MAC value from the Key Master to the ECUs takes around 4ms (steps a, 1 in Fig. 7) . The ECU then performs the necessary calculations to verify the MAC, synchronizes the counter value and then uses KDF to derive the session keys. These steps take around 1ms
(steps b, c). The key derivation is repeated for all the keys that need to be generated. The individual task to generate one session key on the microcontroller level takes around 40us (step 3 processing time), thus the implementation time of 1ms would not significantly change even if several keys are generated at this step.
As a result:
• Total time to derive one or several keys: 5 ms
Every time a session key needs to be used, it needs to be loaded into SHE first. The load time for a key is about 5us. Since there is only one RAM key slot, the corresponding key needs to be loaded before it can be used. For example, if the keys are used for secure invehicle communication, the corresponding key needs 
Analysis about the threats that we defined
For an attacker to be able to load own keys in the ECUs (i.e., be able to load a key in an ECU that the attacker knows), the attacker needs to know the keys 
